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Abstract
Inspired by some spectrum auctions, we consider a stylized license auction with
incumbents and one entrant. Whereas the entrant values only the bundle of
several units (synergy), incumbents are subject to non-increasing demand. The
seller proactively encourages entry and restricts incumbent bidders. In this
framework, an English clock auction gives rise to an exposure problem that
distorts efficiency and impairs revenue. We consider three remedies: a (con-
strained) Vickrey package auction, an English clock auction with exit option
that allows the entrant to annul his bid, and an English clock auction with exit
and entry option that lifts the bidding restriction if entry failed.
Keywords: Auctions, package auctions, combinatorial clock auctions,
spectrum auction, bundling, synergies.
2000 MSC: D21, D43, D44, D45G34.
1. Introduction
Radio spectrum is an essential input to deliver mobile voice and data service
and is required for capacity and coverage purposes. If an operator does not gain
sufficient access to spectrum, he may not be able to deliver service and recover
his cost. During the early years of the mobile phone industry, operators were
awarded radio spectrum either by a managed assignment process or a beauty
contest. However, during the past 15 years, regulators all over the world have
successfully employed auctions to award spectrum which however pose their own
challenges.
In spectrum auctions the regulator typically faces several concerns that are
difficult to reconcile:
• the regulator favors entry, but not at all costs
IFinancial support was received from the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG), SFB
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• entrants require a minimum endowment of spectrum, a spectrum floor,
which gives rise to increasing demand (synergy effect)
• synergies may give rise to an exposure problem which in turn leads to
cautious bidding, a low probability of entry, and low revenue
• revenue matters, not only because debt-ridden governments are short of
revenue but also because license fees are a distortion free method of tax-
ation.
Typically, the regulator responds to these concerns by restricting the bidding
rights of incumbent bidders or by adding provisions that deal with the expo-
sure problem, for example by adopting package or combinatorial clock auctions
(CCA).1 Although some regulators proactively encouraged entry without regard
of cost by reserving some designated lots for entrants.2
An interesting alternative response to these concerns was adopted in the
3G and 4G spectrum auction in Germany in the years 2000 and 2010. There
bidders were entitled to state a minimum requirement for spectrum, with the
provision that if a bidder ends up winning less than his stipulated minimum, his
bids are annulled. In addition, provisions were made to re-auction any left-over
(or “stranded”) spectrum to minimize the risk that spectrum is wasted.3
The present paper is inspired by these rules and contributes to evaluate
their merit. In particular, we ask the questions: does an “exit option” that
allows an entrant to annul his bids if a minimum requirement is not satisfied
resolve the entrants’ exposure problem?; does an “entry option” that allows
an incumbent to acquire stranded spectrum if entry has failed assure that no
spectrum is wasted without compromising the preference for entry? And how
does an auction that includes exit and entry options perform in terms of entry
and seller’s revenue compared to a (constrained) Vickrey package auction that
is usually recommended as a remedy for the exposure problem?
We address these issues in the framework of a stylized model with one entrant
and two incumbents. The entrant is subject to increasing demand (synergy),
due his need for a minimum endowment, whereas incumbents already own com-
plementary spectrum and are subject to flat (or decreasing) demand. The seller
favors entry and restricts incumbent bidders. The seller auctions two blocks of
spectrum of which each incumbent prefers one (because they may be neighbors
to already owned spectrum).
We first consider a constrained English auction and show that it leads to
a double exposure problem for the entrant, because in equilibrium he may win
1Package auctions have been used recently, for example in Austria, Denmark, France, India,
the Netherlands, Nigeria, the UK, and Switzerland. Some of these were sealed-bid first-price
auctions (Austria, France, Nigeria) and others (like Switzerland) employed the CCA format
(for a detailed survey of auction formats employed in recent 4G auctions, see Nett and Stumpf,
2011).
2This policy was adopted in the 3G auction in the U.K. in the year 2000, and more recently
in post-3G auctions in the Czech Republic and in the Netherlands.
3In the 3G auction that minimum requirement was 2 blocks of 2× 5 MHz spectrum in the
1900-2025 MHz band. This requirement was requested by the industry on the ground that
building a 3G network involves a fixed cost in the order of 8 billion DM (roughly 4 billion
Euros), which can only be recovered if with sufficient capacity. The 4G auction did not attract
entrants and incumbents did not stipulated a minimum requirement.
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only one object which has no value or he may win both objects but pay more
than the bundle value.
Both problems can be remedied by allowing the entrant to annul his bid if he
failed to win a stipulated number of units (“exit option”). Moreover, we show
that adding an entry option that lifts bidding restrictions if entry has failed,
further improves the performance. Our main result is that the thus amended
English auction performs better than the constrained Vickrey package auction.
There is a small literature on synergies in auctions (see Krishna and Rosen-
thal, 1996; Rosenthal and Wang, 1996). Package auctions were designed to deal
with synergies in auctions and the resulting exposure problems. The classical
reference is Ausubel and Milgrom (2002); a comprehensive collection of contri-
butions is in Cramton et al. (2006).
For an account of the 3G auction in Germany see Grimm et al. (2004), van
Damme (2002), and Klemperer (2002, 2004), and for the rules of the 4G auction
see Nett and Stumpf (2011).
The plan of the paper is as follows: After stating the model in section 2 we
analyze a standard two-clock English auction in Section 3 and the (constrained)
Vickrey package auction in section 4. The English clock auction is amended by
an exit option for the entrant in Section 5, and by adding an entry option for the
successful incumbent in Section 6. The robustness of our analysis is discussed
in Section 7. The paper concludes with a brief discussion in Section 8.
2. Model
Consider a stylized license auction with two incumbent bidders (A and B),
one potential entrant bidder (E), and two objects for sale (a and b). The entrant
E is free to bid on both objects and values only the bundle of a and b. In other
words, E is subject to a strong synergy (the value of two objects is greater
than the sum of the values for each object alone). Incumbents are subject to a
spectrum cap which restricts them to bid on only one object (A wants a and B
wants b), and if that restriction is lifted they are subject to flat (or decreasing)
demand.
Bidders’ valuations VA, VB , VE are i.i.d. random variables4 drawn from the
c.d.f. F with support (0, 1), and their realizations are their private information.
VA, VB denotes incumbents’ valuations for their preferred object (their valua-
tions for the the bundle are 2VA, 2VB); the entrant’s valuation for the bundle is
2VE whereas his valuation for a single object is equal to zero. F is continuously
differentiable and with p.d.f. f(v) > 0 for all v ∈ (0, 1).
The seller’s own valuation is normalized to zero and the seller neither uses
strategic reserve prices nor entry fees.
The two objects are auctioned simultaneously, using either an English clock
auction with two clocks or a Vickrey package auction.
Two variations of the base model English clock auction are considered:
1) English clock auction with exit option: the entrant has the option to exit
if he fails to win both objects. If that option is exercised, one object is not
4As a rule, random variables are denoted by capital letters and their realization by lower
case letters.
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sold and the seller collects payments only from the one incumbent who won one
object.5
2) English clock auction with exit plus entry options: the auctioneer lifts the
restriction on bidding if the entrant exercised his exit option. In that case, the
incumbent who won the first object has the option to buy the second object at
the price he paid for the first.
In spectrum auctions, the assumed synergy applies because entrants can only
operate profitably if they acquire a minimum amount of spectrum, due to the
high fixed cost of building a network of radio stations, customer base, and billing
system. The regulator often has a preference for entry and thus restricts the
bidding rights of incumbents.6 However, the regulator wants to award all avail-
able spectrum and therefore makes provisions to reallocate stranded spectrum
among incumbents if entry has failed.
3. English (two-)clock auction
In the English (two-)clock auction bidders indicate their demand for object
a or b at given clock prices. Price clocks start at zero, and go up continuously in
response to excess demand. If initially there is excess demand for both objects,
both price clocks go up in tandem; but once there is excess demand for only one
object, one price clock keeps going up while the other stands still. The auction
terminates if there is no excess demand. Then, the remaining active bidders
are awarded the respective object at prices equal to the terminal reading of the
respective price clock.
There are several possible outcomes:
The entrant may be the first to quit. In that case, each incumbent wins his
favored object and pays the price at which the entrant quit.
One incumbent, say A, may be the first to quit. Then, price clock a stops
and E is preliminary winner of a, while bidding continues on b. If thereafter the
entrant is the first to quit auction b, the auction ends: B wins b at the price at
which E quit and E wins a at the price at which A quit and E suffers a loss.
Whereas if B quits auction b before E quits, E wins both objects and pays the
prices at which the two incumbents had quit.
The entrant suffers a winner’s curse if he wins only one object, which is
useless for him, and if he wins both objects but pays more than the bundle
value. As we will show below, in equilibrium both kinds of winner’s curse occur
with positive probability, which in turn induces the entrant to play a cautious
initial stop rule, to the dismay of the seller.
The details of the solution of the game are as follows:
Bidders’ strategies are stop rules. Incumbents bid only on their favored
object; therefore, their bid strategy is a stop rule for their favored object that
prescribes incumbent i ∈ {a, b} to quit auction i at price βi(vi). The entrant’s
strategy is a collection of stop rules (s(vE), σ(vE , p)): 1) the initial stop rule
that prescribes to quit bidding at price s(vE) as long as no incumbent has quit
5Alternatively, the exit option can be replaced by a rule that automatically annuls a bid if
the entrant did not meet the stated minimum requirement.
6An alternative to such spectrum caps has been used recently in Greece. There, entrants
were granted to right to buy an essential endowment of spectrum at fixed prices prior to the
auction.
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before and 2) the continuation stop rule that prescribes to quit the remaining
active auction at price σ(vE , p), after one incumbent has quit first at price p.
Evidently,
Proposition 1. Incumbents have the dominant strategy: bid on your favored
object up to its value, βi(vi) = vi, i ∈ {a, b}, and the entrant has the dominant
continuation strategy: having won one object at price p, bid on the other object
up to the bundle value, σ(vE , p) = 2vE for all p.
Once the entrant has won one object, he is driven to “overbid” on the second
object. The entrant is thus exposed to a double winner’s curse problem: he risks
winning only one object and he risk winning the bundle at a price that exceeds
its value,7 and in either event suffers a loss.
The entrant responds to this double exposure problem by playing a cautious
initial stop rue, s(vE), that exhibits bid shading to counteract the equilibrium
overbidding for the second object, as follows:
Proposition 2. The entrant plays a cautious initial stop rule that exhibits bid
shading, s(vE) < vE. That stop rule is strictly increasing, approaches vE as vE
approaches 1, and solves the “break-even” condition:
s(vE) + E [V | V ∈ (s(vE), 2vE)] = 2vE , for all vE . (1)
That condition prescribes to bid up to that level at which the updated expected
cost of the bundle matches the bundle value.
Proof. Given the continuation strategy σ(vE) = 2vE and incumbents’ equilib-
rium strategy, the entrant’s expected payoff is a function of the initial bid s, as
follows (where f(12)(y, z) denotes the joint p.d.f. of the two order statistics of
incumbents’ i.i.d. valuations)8:
piE(s) = 2vE
∫ s
0
∫ min{2vE ,1}
z
f(12)(y, z)dydz −
∫ s
0
∫ 1
z
zf(12)(y, z)dydz
−
∫ s
0
∫ min{2vE ,1}
z
yf(12)(y, z)dydz.
(2)
The equilibrium strategy s(vE) must solve the best-reply condition: s(vE) =
arg maxs ΠE(s). Using the first-order condition of these maximization problems
yields (1).
To show that s(vE) exhibits bid shading and approaches vE from below
as vE approaches 1, suppose vE ≥ 1/2. Then, the first-order condition of the
best-reply problem, ∂spiE(s) = 0, can be assessed as follows:
0 = 2vE (1− F (s))−
∫ 1
s
(s+ y)dF (y) (3)
< 2vE (1− F (s))− 2s (1− F (s))
= 2 (vE − s) (1− F (s)).
7Note, this can only happen if vE < 1/2; for, if vE ≥ 1/2, 2vE exceeds incumbents’ valuation
with probability 1.
8That joint p.d.f. is f(12)(y, z) = 2f(y)f(z) for y ≥ z and equal to zero otherwise.
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Figure 1: Entrant’s equilibrium strategies, s(vE), σ(vE , p), for the uniform distribution
Hence, s(vE) < vE for all vE ≥ 1/2 (the proof for vE < 1/2 is similar and hence
omitted). Moreover, as vE → 1 the first-order condition (3) implies s(vE)→ vE ,
because by L’Hoˆpital’s rule lims→1
(
1
1−F (s)
∫ 1
s
ydF (y)
)
= 1.
Differentiating the identity (1) in vE with respect to vE confirms the strict
monotonicity of s:
s′(vE) =
2 (F (2vE)− F (s(vE)))
1− F (s(vE)) + 2 (vE − s(vE)) f (s(vE)) > 0.
If F is the uniform distribution, s(vE) takes the form:
s(vE) =
{
1
3
(
1 + 2vE −
√
4vE(1− 2vE) + 1
)
if vE ∈ [0, 1/2]
1
3 (4vE − 1) if vE ≥ 1/2.
, (4)
which is plotted in Figure 1. There, the shaded area indicates the extent of bid
shading during the first phase of the auction.
To compute the seller’s equilibrium expected revenue, one needs to dis-
tinguish between three kinds of events and associated equilibrium prices: 1)
s(VE) < min{VA, VB} ⇒ the entrant quits first at prices equal to s(vE); there-
fore each incumbent wins one object; seller’s revenue Π0 = 2s(VE).
2) s(VE) > min{VA, VB}, 2VE < max{VA, VB} ⇒ one incumbent quits first
and the entrant quits second; therefore, one object is won by the entrant and
one by an incumbent; seller’s revenue Π0 = min{VA, VB} + 2VE .
3) s(VE) > min{VA, VB}, 2VE > max{VA, VB} ⇒ the entrant wins both
objects; seller’s revenue Π0 = VA + VB .
Therefore, the seller’s equilibrium expected revenue, pi0, and equilibrium
probability of entry, ρ, are equal to
pi0 =
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
s(v)
∫ 1
z
2s(v)f(12)(y, z)fE(v)dydzdv
+
∫ 1
0
∫ s(v)
0
∫ 1
min{2v,1}
(z + 2v)f(12)(y, z)fE(v)dydzdv
+
∫ 1
0
∫ s(v)
0
∫ min{2v,1}
z
(z + y)f(12)(y, z)fE(v)dydzdv
(5)
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ρ = Pr{V(2:2) ≤ s(VE) ∧ V(1:2) ≤ 2VE}
=
∫ 1
0
∫ min{2v,1}
s(v)
∫ s(v)
0
f(12)(y, z)f(v)dzdydv.
(6)
If F is the uniform distribution, the seller’s expected revenue is Π0 ≈ 0.598 and
the probability of entry is ρ = 1/2.
Altogether, the English clock auction is unfavorable for the entrant because
it exposes him to a double winner’s curse problem. Because the entrant responds
to this by playing a cautious initial stop rule, it also tends to be unfavorable for
the seller’s revenue. Therefore, it is in the interest of the entrant as well as of
the seller to remedy the exposure problem.
4. (Constrained) Vickrey package auction
In the Vickrey package auction the auctioneer selects the allocation that
maximizes the sum of valuations, and the winner(s) have to pay a price equal to
the sum of valuations crowded out by their participation; like in a single-object
Vickrey auction, truthful bidding is an equilibrium (see Ausubel and Milgrom,
2002).9
In order to be comparable we consider this auction subject to the regulatory
constraint that incumbents cannot be awarded more than one object. As a
benchmark we will also consider the unconstrained Vickrey package auction
without regulatory constraint.
4.1. Constrained Vickrey package auction
In order to characterize the equilibrium outcome and compute the seller’s
equilibrium expected revenue, Π0, one needs to distinguish between the following
events and associated equilibrium prices:
1. 2VE > VA+VB ⇒ the entrant wins the bundle and pays the incumbents’
valuations which he crowds out; seller’s revenue Π0 = VA + VB .
2. 2VE < VA + VB ⇒ the incumbents win their favored objects.
a) min{VA, VB} > 2VE ⇒ no single incumbent crowds out the entrant; seller’s
revenue Π0 = 0.
b) max{VA, VB} > 2VE > min{VA, VB} ⇒ only the high value incumbent
crowds out the entrant; seller’s revenue Π0 = 2VE −min{VA, VB}.
c) max{VA, VB} < 2VE ⇒ each incumbent crowds out the entrant; seller’s
revenue Π0 = 4VE − (VA + VB).
Therefore, the seller’s equilibrium expected revenue, pi0, and the equilibrium
9We do not consider the open ascending bid package auctions that were designed to simplify
bidding and deter strategic manipulations. The most frequently used form of this auction is
the combinatorial clock auction designed by dotecon. There, two stages are distinguished:
In the first stage, bidders bid on their preferred bundle until there is no excess demand; in
the second stage, bidders may make one final bid on all possible bundles, subject to complex
restrictions that reflect their history of bidding during the first stage (see Marsden and Siong,
2010). A good example is the recent Swiss 4G auction (see BAKOM, 2010).
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probability of entry, ρ, are equal to (the lines corresponds to the order of events):
pi0 =
∫ 1
0
∫ min{v,1}
0
∫ min{2v−z,1}
z
(z + y)f(12)(y, z)f(v)dydzdv
+
∫ 1
0
∫ min{2v,1}
min{v,1}
∫ min{2v,1}
z
(4v − z − y)f(12)(y, z)f(v)dydzdv
+
∫ 1
0
∫ min{2v,1}
0
∫ 1
min{2v,1}
(2v − z)f(12)(y, z)f(v)dydzdv
+
∫ 1
0
∫ min{v,1}
0
∫ min{2v,1}
min{2v−z,1}
(4v − z − y)f(12)(y, z)f(v)dydzdv
(7)
ρ = Pr{VA + VB < 2VE}
=
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
0
Pr{VA ≤ 2v − x}f(x)f(v)dxdv
=
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
0
F (v − x)f(x)f(v)dxdv.
(8)
If F is the uniform distribution one finds pi0 = 7/12 ≈ 0.583, which is less
than the expected revenue in the above English clock auction, and ρ = 1/2.
Altogether, the Vickrey package auction eliminates the exposure problem
because it assures that the entrant never wins only one object and never pays
more than the bundle value, and it assures that no object is stranded. However,
the example suggests that it performs poorly in terms of generating revenue to
the seller. Moreover, as is well-known from the literature, the Vickrey package
auction has other deficiencies such as its vulnerability to collusion and shill-
bidding (see Ausubel and Milgrom, 2002; Bulow and Milgrom, 2009; Rothkopf,
2007).
4.2. Unconstrained Vickrey package auction (benchmark)
As a benchmark we also consider the unconstrained Vickrey package auc-
tion, which implements the value maximizing allocation without regard for en-
try. Due to the assumed symmetry, in that case both objects are awarded to the
bidder who has the highest valuation. Because in equilibrium bidders bid truth-
fully, the seller earns twice the second highest valuation. Therefore, the seller’s
equilibrium expected revenue, pi0, and the equilibrium probability of entry, ρ,
are10
pi0 = 2
∫ 1
0
yf(2:3)(y)dy (9)
ρ = Pr{V(1:2) ≤ 2VE} =
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
z
∫ 1
y
f(12)(y, z)f(v)dvdydz (10)
In order to compare the profitability of the constrained and the uncon-
strained Vickrey package auction it is useful to apply the same decomposition
10There, f(2:3)(y) denotes the p.d.f. of the second highest order statistic of a sample of
three i.i.d. random variables.
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of the state space as in (7), and one finds:
pi0 =
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
z
∫ 1
y
2yf(12)(y, z)f(v)dvdydz +
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
z
∫ 1
v
2vf(12)(y, z)f(v)dydvdz
+
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
v
∫ 1
z
2zf(12)(y, z)f(v)dydzdv.
5. English (two-) clock auction with exit option
We now modify the above English clock auction by allowing the entrant to
exit if he has won only one object. If that option is exercised, the entrant returns
the object he won and pays nothing; in that event one object remains unsold.
The exit option induces the entrant to radically change his behavior in three
ways: the entrant always exercise the exit option, gives up his cautious ini-
tial stop rule, and changes his continuation strategy, in such a way that he
never suffers a winner’s curse. Of course, incumbents’ equilibrium strategy is
unchanged.
Again, one finds by elimination of dominated strategies:
Proposition 3. In the English clock auction with exit option, the entrant plays
the bid strategy:
s(vE) = vE (11)
σ(vE , p) = 2vE − p, (12)
and exercises his exit option if he won only one object.
Evidently, the exit option completely removes the exposure risk. The seller
benefits from this in so far as the entrant no longer plays a cautious initial
stop rule. However, his revenue may diminish because the entrant plays a less
aggressive continuation strategy; for the same reason, the effect on the entry
probability, ρ = Pr{V(1:2) < VE ∧ 2VE − V(1:2) > V(2:2)}, is ambiguous.
Figure 2 illustrates the impact of the exit option based on a Monte Carlo
simulation that assumes uniformly distributed valuations. There, we plot the
probability distributions of the seller’s equilibrium revenue. Evidently, adding
the exit option shifts the probability distribution of the seller’s revenue in such
a way that more probability mass is shifted to the tails of the distribution. At
the same time, the expected revenue increases (see Table 1). Therefore, adding
the exit option induces a second-order stochastic dominance shift of the seller’s
revenue.
6. English (two-)clock auction with exit and entry option
Now we further fine-tune the English clock auction by allowing the incum-
bent who won one object to also buy the second object at the price he paid for
the first (or a fixed fraction of that price if demand is diminishing).11. In other
words we supplement the entrant’s exit option with an entry option. That entry
11See Section 7 below.
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option can be exercised by the incumbent who won one object if the incumbent
exercised his exit option.
Obviously, adding the entry option does not affect the equilibrium strategies.
However, it assures that no spectrum is stranded, i.e., all goods are allocated,
and it enhances the seller’s revenue. Indeed, it enhances the seller’s revenue to
such an extent that it always exceeds that of the constrained Vickrey package
auction:
Proposition 4. The English clock auction with exit and entry option (E+) is
superior to the constrained Vickrey package auction (CV): it gives rise to higher
revenue of the seller, the same entry profile, and a superior allocation if entry
fails to occur (and is also superior to the English clock auction with exit but
without entry option and without exit and entry options).
Proof. First we show that the seller’s revenue in the E+ auction is never lower
and almost always higher than in the CV auction:
1) 2VE > VA + VB ⇒ the entrant wins both objects and pays VA + vB , just
like in the CV auction.
2) 2VE < VA + VB ⇒ the incumbents win just like in the CV auction.
2a) min{VA, VB} > VE ⇒ the entrant quits first; therefore, the seller’s revenue
is equal to Π0 = 2vE . This exceeds the seller’s expected revenue in the CV
auction, Π′0, which is equal to
Π′0 =

0 if 2VE < min{VA, VB}
2VE −min{VA, VB} if 2VE ∈
(
min{VA, VB},max{VA, VB}
)
2VE − (VA + VB) if 2VE > max{VA, VB}.
(13)
2b) min{VA, VB} < VE ⇒ the weaker incumbent stops first, and the entrant
stops second; the entrant exercises his exit opion and the stronger incumbent
exercises his entry option; therefore, the seller’s revenue is equal to Π0 = 2
(
2vE−
min{VA, VB}
)
= 4VE − 2 min{VA, VB}. This exceeds the seller’s revenue in the
CV auction, Π′0, which is equal to
Π′0 =
{
2VE −min{VA, VB} if 2VE < max{VA, VB}
4VE − (VA + VB) if 2VE > max{VA, VB}.
(14)
Second, we show that entry occurs in the E+ auction if and only it oc-
curs in the CV auction. Recall, in the E+ auction entry occurs if and only
if VE > min{VA, VB} and 2VE − min{VA, VB} > max{VA, VB}, whereas in
the CV auction entry occurs if and only if 2VE > VA + VB . Suppose en-
try occurs in the E+ auction. Then, 2VE − min{VA, VB} > max{VA, VB}
and hence 2VE > VA + VB which implies that entry occurs in the CV auc-
tion. Next, suppose entry does not occur in the E+ auction. Then, either (a)
2VE − min{VA, VB} < max{VA, VB} or (b) VE < min{VA, VB}. (a) implies
2VE < VA + VB , and similarly, (b) implies 2VE < 2 min{VA, VB} = VA + VB ;
hence, entry does not occur in the CV auction.
Third, notice that if entry does not occur, the VC auction allocates one
object to each incumbent, whereas the E+ auction allocates two objects to the
stronger incumbent if min{VA, VB} > VE , which creates more surplus.
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Constrained English clock auctions Vickrey package auctions
basic +exit option +exit+entry options constrained unconstrained
pi0 0.598 0.667 0.750 0.583 1
Pr{entry} 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.333
Pr{1 stranded} 0.030 0.167 0 0 0
Table 1: Seller’s expected revenue, pi0, entry and leftover probabilities
Constrained Vickrey package auction
+ exit + entry options
Constrained English
clock auction
+ exit option
0.5 1.0 1.5
Π
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
Pr HP0 £ ΠL
Figure 2: Simulation result: c.d.f.’s of the seller’s equilibrium revenue
Table 1 illustrates the performance ranking of all considered auctions assum-
ing uniformly distributed valuations.
In addition, in Figure 2 we summarizes a comparison of the c.d.f. of the
seller’s revenue for all considered auctions, based on simulation that assumes
uniformly distributed values. The simulation was carried out using the Excel
based simulation package by Myerson (2005). These results indicate that all
considered English clock auctions yield a stochastically higher revenue than the
constrained Vickrey package auction in the strong sense of first-order stochastic
dominance. The English clock auction with exit option yields a higher ex-
pected revenue than the plain English clock auction and moreover exhibits less
probability mass on the two tails of the distribution. Therefore, the English
clock auction with exit option second order stochastically dominates the plain
English clock auction. Finally, the English clock auction with exit and entry
option first-order stochastically dominates the English clock auction with exit
option.
7. Extensions and robustness
So far we used two extreme assumptions: 1) if incumbents are restricted to
bid on one object, they bid only on their favored object, and 2) if incumbents
are given an entry option that allows them to bid on more than one object, their
demand is flat, i.e., they value objects the same. These assumptions seem to be
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overly restrictive and may even appear to contradict each other. However, as
we show now, these assumptions should be viewed as facilitating the exposition
only. Indeed, if we replace these restrictive assumptions, our analysis extends
qualitatively and our results become even stronger.
7.1. When goods are substitutes for incumbents
As a first extension suppose incumbents view the two objects as perfect
substitutes. In that case, prices always move up in tandem, because once an
incumbent has quit the auction, the other incumbent will engage in arbitrage
bidding, and alternate bidding on one and the other object. Therefore, if the
entrant wins both objects he now has to pay 2 max{VA, VB}, in lieu of VA +VB .
Of course, after one incumbent has quit first, the other incumbent either bids on
one object or quits. Therefore, the entrant knows that he will necessarily end
up with one object if the remaining incumbent quits before he quits. However,
this does not imply that he should bid the bundle value on each object, because
as long as he continues to bid, he raises the price of the object that he is sure
to win. This induces a strategic “demand reduction” which takes the form of a
strategically reduced stop rule.
Proposition 5. If goods are perfect substitutes, the entrant’s exposure problem
becomes even more severe and the entrant responds by quitting earlier, i.e., both
the initial stop rule, sˆ, and the continuation game stop rule, βˆ, are lower than
if objects cannot be substituted, for all vE , p:
sˆ(vE) < s(vE), and βˆ(vE , p) ≤ β(vE , p). (15)
In particular, if F is convex and vE < 1/2, the entrant quits immediately after
one incumbent has quit first, βˆ(vE , p) = p,∀p, and therefore the entrant does
not bid in the first place, sˆ(vE) = 0,∀vE ≤ 1/2.
Proof. 1) In a first step we solve the continuation strategy βˆ(vE). For this
purpose, suppose one incumbent has quit first at price p while the remaining
incumbent plays his dominant strategy and bids his value (alternating between
bidding on A and B so that prices move up in tandem). For simplicity we write
bˆ := min{βˆ(vE), 1}.
1a) If vE ≥ 1/2, the entrant’s best reply is to bid up to the bundle value
2vE , because the remaining incumbent will quit with probability one at a price
below 1, which is below the bundle value 2vE ≥ 1.
1b) If vE < 1/2, the entrant’s best reply is to bid less than the bundle
value 2vE . In particular, the entrant’s expected profit is a function of his bid b
(stopping point) and the price p, as follows:12
ΠE(b, p) =
∫ b
p
2(vE − v) f(v)1− F (p)dv − b
∫ 1
b
f(v)
1− F (p)dv (16)
∂bΠE(b, p) =
1
1− F (p)ϕ(b), ϕ(b) := f(b)
(
2vE − b− 1− F (b)
f(b)
)
. (17)
12We assume without loss of generality b ≤ 1.
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The best reply is either a corner solution, bˆ ∈ {p, 1} or an interior solution that
solves the condition ϕ(bˆ) = 0 for some bˆ ∈ (p, 1). Evidently, the corner solution
bˆ = 1 cannot apply because b = 1⇒ ∂bΠE(b, p) < 0.
If there is an interior solution, one has ϕ(b) = 0 and hence
bˆ = 2vE − (1− F (bˆ))
f(bˆ)
< 2vE , (18)
as asserted.
However, typically the solution is the corner solution bˆ = p (stop imme-
diately). In particular, if F is convex (which includes the uniform distribu-
tion case), the best reply is bˆ = p because there is no interior solution and
b = p⇒ ∂bΠE(b, p) < 0, because
ϕ(b) : = (2vE − b)f(b)−
∫ 1
b
f(v)dv
≤ (2vE − b)f(b)−
∫ 1
b
f(b)dv (because f is non-decreasing)
= f(b)(2vE − 1)
< 0 (because vE < 1/2).
2) Next, we characterize the initial stop rule, sˆ, and show that sˆ(vE) < s(vE),
for all vE .
Using the same qualitative distinction of events as in the proof of Proposi-
tion 2, the reduced form payoff function (incorporating the equilibrium of the
continuation game) as a function of the initial stop rule, s, is
piE(s) =2vE
∫ s
0
∫ bˆ
z
f(12)(y, z)dydz −
∫ s
0
∫ bˆ
z
2yf(12)(y, z)dydz
− bˆ
∫ s
0
∫ 1
bˆ
f(12)(y, z)dydz.
2a) Suppose vE ≥ 1/2, then bˆ = 1 and sˆ(vE) must solve the condition
∂spiE(s) = 0. For all s ∈ (0, 1] the sign of ∂spiE(s) is the same as the sign
of 2vE − E[2V | V > s]. Therefore, sˆ(vE) must solve the condition: gˆ(s) :=
E[2V | V > s] = 2vE . Similarly, the initial stop rule in the model when goods
are not substitutes, s(vE), solves the condition (see (3)): g(s) := E[V + s | V >
s] = 2vE . Obviously, gˆ(s) > g(s); and because gˆ, g are strictly increasing, it
follows immediately that sˆ(vE) < s(vE).
2b) Suppose vE < 1/2. Then, βˆ has either the corner solution to stop imme-
diately or an interior solution characterized by (18).
If βˆ has the corner solution, which occurs for example if F is convex, the
entrant cannot ever win the bundle of goods, and therefore does not bid at all;
in that case, trivially, sˆ(vE) = 0 < s(vE).
Whereas if βˆ has the interior solution, sˆ solves the condition ∂spiE(s) = 0
which can be rewritten as∫ 1
bˆ
sdF (y) =
∫ b∗
s
(2vE − y)dF (y)−
∫ b∗
s
ydF (y).
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Adding
∫ bˆ
s
sdF (y) to both sides of the equation one has∫ 1
s
sdF (y) =
∫ bˆ
s
(2vE − y)dF (y)−
∫ bˆ
s
(y − s)dF (y) (19)
<
∫ bˆ
s
(2vE − y)dF (y)
<
∫ 2vE
s
(2vE − y)dF (y).
Now recall that the initial stop rule when goods are not substitutable, s(vE),
and vE < 1/2, solves the condition∫ 1
s
sdF (y) =
∫ 2vE
s
(2vE − y)dF (y). (20)
Because the RHS of (19) is smaller than the RHS of (20) and
∫ 2vE
s
(2vE−y)dF (y)
is decreasing in s, it follows that sˆ(vE) < s(vE), as asserted.
Similar reasoning applies if the two objects are imperfect substitutes and the
favored object is worth only a multiple of the favored object.
7.2. When incumbents’ demand is decreasing (rather than flat)
Our analysis also extends to the case when incumbents value the non-
preferred object by a multiple γ of the preferred object’s valuation. In that
case the entry option must take the form that the incumbent who won the first
object can buy the second at γ times the price of the first object (provided the
entrant exercised his exit option).
8. Discussion
One limitation of the present analysis is that we consider the sale of only
two blocks of spectrum.
If more than two blocks of the same kind are made available, it is typically
the case that neighboring spectrum is more valuable because the operator can
better deal with interferences if he controls neighboring spectrum. This gives rise
to yet another exposure risk issue: the risk of acquiring a fragmented portfolio
of spectrum. In that regard, the designers of the spectrum auctions in Germany
innovated another nice idea: the sale of generic, unnamed lots.
If generic lots are traded, at the time of bidding bidders do not know which
concrete lots will be acquired. The regulator promises to allocate neighboring
frequencies to achieve a contiguous holding of spectrum, after the auction. The
advantage of this procedure is that bidders do not need to worry about fragmen-
tation and at the time of the auction, all lots of the same kind are homogeneous
goods which greatly simplifies bidding.13
13Generic lots were employed in the German 2G, 3G, and in part in the recent 4G simul-
taneous multi-round auction. In the latter, the auctioned UMTS (2.2 GHz) frequencies were
concrete (named) frequencies. These frequencies were resold in the year 2010 because two
winners of the 3G auction in the year 2000 had unexpectedly returned their licenses shortly
after the auction. Generic lots have also been employed in simultaneous multi-round spectrum
auctions in other countries.
14
References
Ausubel, L., Milgrom, P., 2002. Ascending auctions with package bidding. Fron-
tiers of Theoretical Economics 1, Article 1.
BAKOM, 2010. Auktionsregeln fu¨r die kombinierte Vergabe von Frequenzspek-
trum in den 900 Mhz-, 900 Mhz-, 1,8 Ghz-, 2,1 Ghz und 2,6 Ghz-Ba¨ndern.
Schweizerisches Bundesamt fu¨r Kommunikation, Official document.
Bulow, J., J. L., Milgrom, P., 2009. Winning play in spectrum auctions. Working
Paper 14765, NBER.
Cramton, P., Shoham, Y., Steinberg, R. (Eds.), 2006. Simultaneous, Ascending
Auctions. MIT Press.
Grimm, V., Riedel, F., Wolfstetter, E., 2004. The third generation (UMTS)
spectrum auction in Germany. In: Illing, G., Klu¨h, U. (Eds.), Spectrum Auc-
tions and Competition in Telecommunication. MIT Press, pp. 223–246.
Klemperer, P., 2002. How (not) to run auctions: the European 3G telecom
auctions. European Economic Review 46, 829–845.
Klemperer, P., 2004. The third generation (UMTS) spectrum auction in Ger-
many: A comment. In: Illing, G., Klu¨h, U. (Eds.), Spectrum Auctions and
Competition in Telecommunication. MIT Press, pp. 223–246.
Krishna, V., Rosenthal, R., 1996. Simultaneous auctions with synergies. Games
and Economic Behavior 17, 1–13.
Marsden, R., E. S., Siong, A., 2010. Fixed or flexible? A survey of 2.6 Ghz
spectrum awards. Working paper, dot.econ.
Myerson, R. B., 2005. Probability Models for Economic Decisions. Thomson.
Nett, L., Stumpf, U., 2011. Neue Verfahren fu¨r Frequenzauktionen: Konzep-
tionelle Ansa¨tze und internationale Erfahrungen. Working Paper 360, Wis-
senschaftliches Institut f. Infrastruktur und Kommunikationsdienste (WIK).
Rosenthal, R. W., Wang, R., 1996. Simultaneous auctions with synergies and
common values. Games and Economic Behavior 17, 32–55.
Rothkopf, M. H., 2007. Thirteen reasons why the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves process
is not practical. Operations Reserach 55, 191–197.
van Damme, E., 2002. The European UMTS-auctions. European Economic Re-
view 46, 846–858.
15
